This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self- archived in electronic repositories. Moral relativism 1 Introduction Evolution has since the publication of The origin of species been a source of inspiration, and a bone of contention, not only for biology but also for philosophy and the sciences of man. The moral consequences of Darwinism have been a concern for ethicists since Herbert Spencer elevated the survival of the fittest to a norm underwriting cultural and societal progress—hard for the individual perhaps, but good for mankind. In the past years several varieties of evolutionary ethics have been proposed.
In light of the EVP it can be rational to gamble on an improbable outcome given a sufficiently high potential payoff. Of course, in the case of God, it is hard to determine Emotionism religion essay the chances of a successful outcome might be: But that is irrelevant, Pascal argues, because the payoff if God exists is an infinite payoff.
Thus, the potential for infinite gain makes it rational to bet that God exists, however slim the actual chances of this might be: In the first place, it has been said that any argument which seeks to justify faith entirely in such crassly prudential terms is necessarily impious or improper.
In this essay, I present three arguments for the claim that theists should reject divine command theory in favor of divine attitude theory. Arguments Against Theism, Misc in Philosophy of Religion. Meta-Ethics, General Works in Meta-Ethics. Metaphysics, Meta-Ethics, General Works in Meta-Ethics. Moral Naturalism in Meta-Ethics. Value. Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo benjaminpohle.comnced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his book Language, Truth . As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson's sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan.
It is intended simply as a first step toward, and not as a substitute for, genuine religious faith. It is important to appreciate that Pascal is not urging his readers to believe something they otherwise have reason to doubt.
But can one choose to believe for purely instrumental reasons? However, Pascal anticipates this objection, arguing that a would-be believer should begin by imitating the motions of a believer. By, for instance, attending Mass and taking holy water, a would-be believer may succeed in cultivating genuine belief.
This argument suggests that Pascal is committed to the less controversial thesis of indirect doxastic voluntarism—the view that a person can indirectly control his or her beliefs by directly controlling his or her epistemic situation.
Still, the prospect of voluntarily inducing belief for purely non-epistemic reasons has struck many commentators as manipulative and self-deceptive. It is of course the case, as Pascal claims, that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob either exists or does not exist, but the same is true of a seemingly endless number of other possible deities.
If we assume the possibility of infinite reward in each case, it is no longer clear that Catholicism is any more rational than its religious alternatives. Jordan follows Pascal in treating religious belief as a necessary prerequisite for eternal happiness.
However, some critics have questioned this assumption. How do we know—it might be asked—that if he or she exists, God would make salvation contingent on correct belief? Indeed, if one grants that there is even a small chance of achieving infinite bliss by pursuing a non-religious path, then the EVP suggests that such a path would be just as rational in light of its expected value.
Whereas Pascal held that the payoff of believing in God would be infinite, if God exists, Golding is careful to insist that the value of a good relationship with God is finite.
Otherwise, as he notes, we are faced with the problem—alluded to above—that more than one path might be equally rational for a person in light of its expected value. If, however, the value of a good relationship with God is finite, then whichever path is deemed to have the greatest chance of success at achieving this reward will have the highest expected value, other things being equal.
Of course, the expected value of the good relationship with God must be higher than the expected value of any non-religious pursuit, however likely the latter is to result in a mundane payoff. Thus, although the argument purports to show that religious theism is a more rational choice, it seems ultimately to hinge not on an objective comparison of two commensurable quantities but on a preference for goods of a certain type.
It might well be the case that certain goods are preferable to others, even though there is no single scale of value by means of which to rank them, but showing this would seem to require a different sort of argument than the one Golding presents. In any event, it is worth noting that Pascal and his intellectual heirs, though frequently characterized as fideists, are not antagonistic to reason tout court.
In the first place, as Pascal sees it, it is reasonable to acknowledge limits to reason.
Thus, Pascal invokes reason to justify what might otherwise appear to be its antithesis. In The Point of View for My Work as an Author—one of the few works to which Kierkegaard — was willing to append his own signature—he explains his use of the pseudonyms by noting that philosophical and religious confusion can be addressed only indirectly: He adds that the illusion against which his pseudonymous writings are directed is an illusion about what Christianity requires, and that these writings, though employing philosophical tools, thus subserve a religious intent.
Hegel is frequently—if not always entirely fairly—parodied in this connection. In so doing, it imports into religion modes of inquiry that distort the essential nature of faith. It is perhaps tempting to imagine that the relation between evidence and belief is purely epistemological, a question of justification.
There are different kinds of beliefs, logically speaking, and different ways in which entitlement to such beliefs is vindicated. The basic error to which philosophical systematizers are prone, he argues, is assuming that the criteria for evaluating a belief in one context are equally appropriate in other contexts.Religion is a hard concept to comprehend.
It is showing us a different side to look at our life.
Instead of having hard facts that can be physically proven, religion shows us to take a leap of faith and believe the impossible. Sep 30, · Emotivism pays close attention to the way in which people use language and acknowledges that a moral judgement expresses the attitude that a .
May 08, · Phillips, however, argued that philosophy and religion are two different groups, and as a result both have different definitions of God. Phillips plainly states that because the definitions are different, you cannot be a part of both. Buddhism is conventionally regarded as a religion, and indeed over the centuries it adopted religious trappings in many places.
His essay “ Utilitarianism As discussed in the brief survey above, the history of Western ethics from the time of the Sophists to the end of the 19th century shows three constant themes.
First, there is the. May 08, · Phillips, however, argued that philosophy and religion are two different groups, and as a result both have different definitions of God. Phillips plainly states that because the definitions are different, you cannot be a part of both.
“What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” () This question of the relation between reason—here represented by Athens—and faith—represented by Jerusalem—was posed by the church father Tertullian (c– CE), and it remains a central preoccupation among contemporary philosophers of religion.